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Abstract
This paper analyses the role of ratication quotas in multilateral agreements over
emission reduction. The higher is the quota, the lower is the level of emissions in case
the agreement comes into force, but the higher is also the risk of failure. In a setting
with incomplete information, two country types and a binary contribution to the
provision, I examine the di¤erences between simultaneous and sequential ratication.
When the benets from emission of both types are smaller than the social costs, the
outcome in the simultaneous case is essentially identical to the sequential case. The
optimal quota is 100% and achieves the rst best. With the high types benets
exceeding the social costs, I nd that the optimal quota is as small as possible, if
ratication is simultaneous. In the sequential ratication case, I cannot determine the
optimal quota. However, I nd that the aggregate expected surplus decreases with
respect to the simultaneous case.
JEL classication: D71, H41
KEYWORDS: public goods, international bargaining, ratication, emission games
1 Introduction
For the international provision of global public goods, country representatives gather and
bargain over individual contribution levels. The resulting agreement not only species
each countrys contribution, typically it also contains a ratication quota, the minimum
number of countries that have to ratify the agreement to render it legally binding for the
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ratifying countries. This paper explores the e¤ect of a ratication quota on the provision
of a transboundary public good. It focuses on two channels via which the quota might
impact the provision of the public good. On the one hand, the higher the quota, the higher
is the level of the public good provision whenever the agreement comes into e¤ect. On
the other hand, a higher quota may also increase the chance of a contractual breakdown,
as an insu¢ cient number of countries ratify the agreement. The present paper captures
this trade-o¤ in a three stage model where countries rst determine the ratication quota,
they then decide whether to ratify and at the last stage provide the public good. The
three stage nature is inspired by reality where the national representatives rst negotiate
the agreement, before typically the legislative body of the country decides on ratication
and therewith on the provision of the public good. I examine the di¤erences between
the situations where each country decides to ratify simultaneously or where it does so
sequentially and identify circumstances where it is optimal to have a high or a low quota.1
I consider the special case of emission of a global pollutant, like carbondioxides fostering
global warming. I restrict the setting to a binary type space; countries have either high or
low benets from local emission. When deciding on the ratication, countries know their
own benet parameter, but not the parameter of any other country. Their expectations
of how many other countries ratify are thus crucial in the analysis. In their ratication
decision, countries trade-o¤ the expected gain with the expected costs of ratication. I
distinguish between the case where the benet of the high type is smaller or where it is
larger than the social costs. With simultaneous ratication, I nd that the optimal quota
is 100% if individual benets of the high type do not exceed the social costs of emission.
Otherwise, if the high types benets are larger than the social costs, the optimal quota
is as small as possible such that it still induces the low type to ratify. In this latter case,
the optimal quota increases with the benet parameter as well as with the probability
of the low type. Furthermore, the optimal quota increases with the number of countries
and the optimal quota relative to the number of countries decreases with the number of
countries. With sequential ratication, the optimal quota is again 100% if the individual
benets of the high types are smaller than the social costs. However, when the individual
benet of the high type is larger than the social costs, the aggregate expected surplus
decreases with respect to the simultaneous case. The sequential structure potentially
discloses information inducing some low types to refrain from ratication, whereas in the
simultaneous structure all low types ratify.
This paper is closely related to Black, Levi, and de Meza (1993). They simulate the
e¤ect of a minimum ratication quota on the provision of a global public good. In a
1 In reality, ratication quotas di¤er. The Kyoto Protocol species that 55 countries (out of 166 sig-
natories) which have to cover at least 55% of total emissions in 1990 have to ratify. The Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling indicates 6 countries (out of 14 signatories) including the Netherlands, Norway,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the UK, and the USA. Finally, for the International Criminal
Court to come into force, 60 countries (out of 139 signatories) had to ratify. Mostly, ratication quotas
are substantially di¤erent from 100% as well as from e¤ectively no quota.
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simultaneous ratication setting where the types of countries are continuous, Black, Levi,
and de Meza nd that the optimal ratication quota relative to the number of countries
is relatively robust to variations in the number of countries and in the cost parameter,
but that it is not robust with respect to the distribution of benets. In contrast, for the
binary type setting I nd that the optimal quota decreases with the number of countries,
increases with the cost parameter and also increases with the probability of a low type.
These di¤erences stem from the di¤erent modelling of types. In a setting with binary
types, all low types ratify; whereas with continuous types, there exists a critical value
such that only those types exceeding this value ratify. This critical value is inuenced by
all model parameters.
A strand of coalition theory examines the provision of public goods and in particular
emission reduction using a cooperative game theory approach.2 Part of this literature
focuses on the e¤ect of ratication quotas in international environmental treaties, called
minimum participation levels in that literature. The paper by Rutz (2001) introduces
a minimum participation rule in the context of a two-stage coalition model. It shows
that a participation rule can potentially overcome the free-rider problem of transbound-
ary pollution. Carraro, Marchiori, and Ore¢ ce (2003) endogenise the participation rule
by extending the model via a preceding stage where countries determine the minimum
participation level. They establish that the grand coalition is stable with a 100% quota.
Furthermore, they determine conditions under which all players agree to a 100% quota.
The literature on step-level public goods centers on the participation issue in the
provision of discrete public goods. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) analyse participation to
the provision of a binary public good where a xed number of contributors is needed to
provide the public good. In contrast to my paper, they assume complete information of the
symmetric players and nd that the e¢ cient number of players contribute in equilibrium.
They do not consider the role of the xed number of contributors.
Next, I outline the model and its basic assumptions. For simultaneous ratication,
section 3 characterises the optimal quota as well as some comparative statics results.
Section 4 presents basic results for the case of sequential ratication. The last section
summarises the results and indicates future paths of research.
2For example, Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), DAspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz, and Weymark
(1983), Finus and Rundshagen (2001), Barrett (1994) and Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2002) look at
the provision of a public good within a two-stage coalition model. On the rst stage, a single coalition is
formed by simultaneous decisions of all countries. On the second stage, countries contribute in a static
or dynamic game. In these models, the stable coalitions are generally small regardless of the number of
participating countries. The grand coalition is always e¢ cient, though not stable. For an introduction
to the literature on international environmental agreements and coalition theory, see Barrett (2003), in
particular chapter 7.
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2 Model
N countries participate in an international bargaining process over the emission of a global
pollutant. At the rst stage, countries bargain over a ratication quota. A ratication
quota Q 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng is dened as the absolute number of countries that have to ratify
the agreement to render it legally binding. Remember, only those countries that ratify the
agreement will enforce the provisions of the agreement. At the second stage, each country
decides whether to ratify. At the last stage, if a country ratied, it fullls its obligations
of the agreement, or otherwise emits freely.
Countries benet from their own, local emission through production and consumption
activities. But they su¤er from the sum of all emissions, called global emission as these
reduce environmental quality globally. The relation between the benets of local emis-
sion and the harm of global emission is expressed by the parameter . Countriesutility
functions are captured by
ui
0@ei; NX
j=1
ej
1A = iei   NX
j=1
ej
where ei 2 f0; 1g indicates the emission level of country i. I treat the emission decision
as binary.3 Whenever a country is not member to the agreement, it chooses an emission
level independently of all other countriesemissions. If the benets of emission are small
in relation to the costs, i.e. i  1, country i does not emit, while in the reverse case,
whenever i > 1, it does emit.
All countries that ratied the agreement satisfy their obligations in case the agreement
gets legally binding. I neglect the problem of compliance. With this assumption and the
specied utility function, the emission choice on the third stage of the game is uniquely
determined.
At the time of deciding on a quota, countries have no information on any of the
benet-damage parameters i. However, they know the distribution function F (i) which
is assumed to be identical and independent for each country i. During the time which
elapses between the bargaining over the agreement and its ratication, new information
outcrops. Each country i learns its own value of i, but not the realisations of the other
countriesparameters. This formulation can be seen as a benchmark analysis to the case
where countries do not learn the exact value of their benet parameter, but get a more
precise signal on it. I assume that the parameter can amount two distinct values, a low
value L and a high value H , with L < H . The probability of a low value is denoted
by p = prob ( = L). After the revelation of information, countries decide whether to
3This assumption is particularly helpful as it reduces the dimension of the social maximisation problem.
When it comes to the determination of the optimal emission level specied in the agreement, the interesting
case is one in which no emission for the ratifying countries is desirable. The agreement therefore essentially
determines a level of the ratication quota.
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ratify the agreement. I look at two distinct scenarios, the rst where countries ratify
simultaneously and the second where they do so sequentially, one after the other. In
the latter version, when deciding on a quota, countries do not know the order of play.
However, they know that it is equally likely to be in any position. Each possible order has
the same probability of being drawn after the countries have agreed on the ratication
quota. Figure 1 illustrates the time structure of the game.
Figure 1: Timing of the game
-
0 1 2
contract i 2 fL; Hg 8i 2 N
ratication
emission
In a rst best world countries internalise the negative externality of their local emission
on the rest of the world. As long as the benet i of local emissions to country i is smaller
than the social cost of local emissions N , country i does not emit in a rst best world.
However, whenever countries are free to emit, they only take into account the damage of
their local emission caused on themselves. They neglect the e¤ect of their emission on all
other countries. An agreement with a minimum participation level can help to ameliorate
this classical free-rider problem. With a minimum participation rule, countries take into
account that they may eventually cause a breakdown of the agreement with their decision.
An optimal quota is dened to be the number of necessary ratications that maximises
the aggregate expected surplus. A quota that achieves the rst best outcome is clearly
optimal. Whenever the rst best level of pollution is achieved in the Nash equilibrium of
the emission game, the design and ratication process of an agreement is of no interest.
In these cases, an agreement cannot improve the allocation. The focus of this paper is
thus on situations where the Nash equilibrium of the emission game does not achieve the
rst best outcome. As all players are symmetric at the time of deciding on the quota, the
voting process is not essential. All players solve the same maximisation problem and thus
decide unanimously on a quota. Therefore, I neglect the design of the voting mechanism.
In the ratication game, players have identical binary action sets Ai = f0; 1g with
actions labeled fdo not ratify, ratifyg. A strategy prole si (ijQ) of country i assigns an
action ai 2 Ai to every type i 2 fL; Hg given a quota Q 2 f1; :::; Ng. There might
be multiple equilibria in the ratication game. The aggregate expected surplus therefore
depends not only on the ratication quota but also on the specic equilibrium.4
Denition 1 The optimal quota maximises the aggregated expected utility, i.e. Q =
argmaxQ2f1;:::;Ng

argmaxs(jQ)N  Eu ((s (jQ)))
	
where
4For the denition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, see chapter 2.6 and
12.3 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
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s (jQ) = (s1 (1jQ) ; :::; sN (N jQ)) constitutes a symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(BNE) in pure strategies of the simultaneous ratication game or a symmetric Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies of the sequential ratication game.
The denition of the optimal quota relates to pure strategies. The focus of this paper
is to ask what is implementable in pure strategies. The interpretation of mixed strategies
is debated among game theorists, see chapter 3 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). Con-
sidering exclusively pure strategies, avoids the interpretation of mixed strategies in the
ratication setting and nds the minimum expected utility that can be implemented in
the stronger concept of pure strategies. However, in what follows, I also discuss how the
results might change when we allow for mixed strategies.
Next, I solve for the optimal quota in the simultaneous case and establish when it
achieves the rst best allocation. Furthermore, I conduct some comparative statics on the
optimal quota.
3 Simultaneous ratication
In this section, I analyse the case where all countries ratify simultaneously. With simul-
taneous ratication, countries do not know how many other countries are ratifying. They
can merely infer the probability that there is a su¢ cient number of ratications such
that the agreement gets legally binding. Suppose a country is pivotal, i.e. without this
countrys ratication the agreement fails. Then, ratication reduces global emissions by
the sum of the reduced local emissions of all the ratifying countries. The expected gain
of ratication equals the sum of reductions minus the benet of local emission times the
probability of being pivotal. Now, suppose a country is not pivotal. Ratication then im-
plies that this country incurs costs amounting to the foregone benets minus the damage
of local emissions in case the agreement becomes binding. The expected loss of ratication
of the country equals these costs times the probability that the quota is satised without
this countrys ratication. A country raties if the sum of these net expected gains from
ratication exceed naught.
I distinguish between a situation where the agreement aims at inducing cooperation
among all types and a situation where it aims at low types only. These two situations
di¤er substantially. In the rst case, the optimal quota is as large as possible, while in
the second, the reverse is true. The following sections show the reasoning and intuition
behind these results.
Case 1: Participation of High Types In this section, I analyse the cases where both
types of countries prefer no emissions by any country to maximum emissions by every
country. This occurs if the benets of both types are smaller than the social costs of
emission, L; H  N . In the rst best allocation, no country emits pollutants and the
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sum of utilities is zero. However, whenever countries are free to decide on emission, they
emit as long as their individual benets are large enough. That is as long as  > 1.
An agreement, specifying that a certain amount of countries have to ratify before
the agreement comes into force, can ameliorate the free-rider problem inherent in that
situation. Suppose the ratication quota is 100%. Then, each country is pivotal for the
emergence of the agreement. The potential loss in case of contractual breakdown is large,
as emissions might rise from none at all to the maximal level of emissions N . This is
an extreme scenario as the agreement induces all countries to take their decision on the
background of comparing a situation with no emission to a situation with full emission by
all countries.5 Ratication of all countries and therefore the rst best allocation can be
achieved.
The above argument relies on the assumption that all countries, regardless of their
type, emit if the agreement fails. However, benets of the low type countries might be
smaller than the individual costs, i.e. L  1. Low types might thus abstain from emis-
sion regardless of the agreement. In this case, the agreement tries to establish cooperation
foremost among the high types. Suppose again that the ratication quota is 100% and
every country is pivotal. Whenever the agreement fails, the loss for the high type countries
is smaller than in the above scenario as low type countries do not emit for sure. For the
agreement to successfully lure high types to participation, the expected gain from rati-
cation must exceed the loss H . Countries that ratify forego the damage of their own
emission plus the expected damage of emissions by the remaining N   1 countries. There-
fore, the expected gain of ratication amounts to 1 + (N   1) (1  p). Given that gains
exceed losses, ratication of all countries can be achieved by a 100% quota. Proposition 1
summarises this by characterising the conditions under which the symmetric pure strategy
to ratify regardless of the benet type is a BNE and stating the optimal quota.
Proposition 1 Given H  N , a quota Q = N is a necessary condition for the symmetric
pure strategy s (j jQ) = 1 for j 2 fL; Hg to be a BNE. If L > 1, this is su¢ cient.
Otherwise, additionally H  1+ (N   1) (1  p) has to be satised. The optimal quota is
Q = N .
Proof. If Q < N , there exists an incentive to deviate from the proposed equilibrium
strategy. Given all other countries follow the proposed strategy to ratify regardless of their
type, country is incentive to deviate is
D (j ; Q < N) = E (u (0jj ; Q < N))  E (u (1jj ; Q < N)) (1)
= j   1
5Suppose one country abstains from ratication. One might think that it is not credible that there will
be no cooperation among the ratifying countries. The literature on coalition formation shows, however,
that the maximum number of countries forming a stable coalitions in public good environments is very
small, see Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and DAspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz, and Weymark (1983).
Therefore the situation is close to the one modelled.
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for j 2 fL;Hg. At least for the high type H , equation (1) is positive and thus the country
has an incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy.
If Q = N and L > 1, there exists no incentive to deviate as each country is pivotal
and D (j ; N) = j  N  0 for j 2 fL;Hg. If Q = N , but L  1 holds, then there is no
incentive to deviate for the high types if
D (H ; N) = H   1 
N 1X
P=0
b (P jN   1; p) (N   1  P )
= H  N + (N   1) p  0
where b (P jN   1; p) denotes the binomial distribution
b (P jN   1; p) =
 
N   1
P
!
pP (1  p)N 1 P . This implies the stated condition.
For L > 1 or L  1 and H  1 + (N   1) (1  p), a 100% quota implies that there
is no global emission. Hence Q = N achieves the rst best outcome and is thus optimal.
For L  1 and H > 1 + (N   1) (1  p), all low types do not emit while all high types
emit when there is no agreement. No agreement irrespective of the quota can improve on
this result. By denition, any quota is therefore optimal.
The intuition is straightforward. If each country has a relatively small benet from its
own emission, a 100% quota forces participation of all countries and induces the rst best
allocation with no emission.6 The restriction to pure strategies is innocuous in this case.
Whenever the pure strategy to ratify regardless of the type can be implemented with a
100% quota, this quota achieves the rst best and no other equilibrium can improve on
that. Furthermore, if the low types benet L is smaller than 1 and the condition that
H  1 + (N   1) (1  p) is not met, then mixed strategies cannot improve the outcome
either. Keep in mind that in this situation we cannot induce high types to ratify even
if all other countries do ratify. The expected gain from a working agreement is simply
not large enough. If we allow high types to mix, then the expected utility of ratication
decreases further. Appendix 6.A illustrates that even though the expected utility of no
ratication also decreases, it always exceeds the expected utility of ratication. There is
thus no mixed strategy equilibrium.
We now turn to the situation where the benet of the high types exceeds the social
costs and high types are thus never going to participate.
Case 2: Participation of Low Types The situation is di¤erent when we look at cases
where the high typesbenets are above the social costs, H  N . It is not possible to
induce these countries to ratify an agreement which obliges them to abstain from emission.7
6 In the paper by Black, Levi, and de Meza (1993) this case is not considered. In their simulations, they
assume that the benet parameter is xed  > 1 and the costs are drawn from the unit interval c 2 (0; 1).
Thus, types with low costs prefer to emit than to ratify.
7We abstract from the possibility of side payments, see the conclusion for further discussion.
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Hence, an agreement can only build up cooperation among the low benet types. The
candidate symmetric pure strategy is to ratify if the country is of low type and to abstain
otherwise, s (ijQ) =
(
1 if i = L
0 else
.
Given a ratication quota Q, there are N   Q + 1 possible states at the last stage
of the game. There is either no binding agreement or an agreement that is binding for
P 2 fQ; :::; Ng countries. The incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy given all
other N   1 countries follow the strategy is given by the incentive expression
D (L; Q) = E (u (0jL; Q))  E (u (1jL; Q))
= (L   1)
N 1X
P=Q
b (P jN   1; p)  (Q  L) b (Q  1jN   1; p) , (2)
where (P jN   1; p) again denotes the binomial distribution with parameters N   1 and
p.8 The proposed strategy to ratify if of low type and not otherwise is only sustainable in
equilibrium if the incentive expression (2) is negative.
The rst term captures the expected costs of ratication whenever the agreement gets
legally binding and the country is not pivotal. It is the probability that more than Q
countries ratify times the benet of local emission L minus the damage of local emission
of 1. Whereas the second term signies the gain of ratication if the agreement gets binding
and the country is pivotal, i.e. exactly Q   1 other countries ratied. A straightforward
insight is that whenever there is no gain from ratication, that is, whenever the quota
is smaller than the benets, the proposed strategy cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
This implies a lower bound on the optimal quota Q > L. It is not possible to solve
analytically for the quota at which equation (2) equals zero (resp. is just negative).
However, Proposition 2 shows that this minimum quota is optimal.
Proposition 2 With 1 < L  N < H and p 2 (0; 1), there exists a unique optimal
quota Q that is the smallest integer for which D (L; Q)  0.
Proof. The aggregate expected surplus is maximised if the individual expected utility
is maximised, pE (u (s (LjQ))) + (1  p)E (u (s (H jQ))) ! maxQ. Given each country
follows the strategy s (ijQ) =
(
1 if i = L
0 else
, taking rst di¤erences of the individual
expected utility yields
b (Q  1jN   1; p) p (L  N) < 0. (3)
The derivation of (3) is found in Appendix 6.C. Thus, the quota that maximises individual
and therewith aggregate surplus is as small as possible, still satisfying equation (2).
Next, I turn to characterise the incentive expression (2). For all Q 2 [1; L], the
incentive expression is positive as there is no gain from being pivotal, i.e. D (L; Q) 
8A detailed derivation of the incentive expression can be found in Appendix 6.B.
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(L   1)
PN 1
i=dLe b (ijN   1; p) > 0. Moreover, whenever the quota is 100%, the incentive
expression becomes strictly negative,
D (L; N) = b (N   1jN   1; p) (L  N) < 0. Taking rst di¤erences of the incentive
expression using the fact that
b (QjN   1; p) = b (Q  1jN   1; p) p
1  p
N  Q
Q
(4)
yields
D (L; Q+ 1) D (L; Q) =  b (Q  1jN   1; p)

pN  Q
1  p + L

The incentive expression is therefore decreasing in Q if Q  Q0 = p (N   L) + L and
is increasing if Q  Q0 = p (N   L) + L. This implies that D (L; ) jumps the x-axis
exactly once. The minimum quota that still satises the incentive expression (2) is located
at the jump (or just after).
Proposition 2 states that it is optimal to set the ratication quota as low as possible to
the level where the low type country is just willing to ratify. Intuitively, this is appealing.
If the quota is lower than this level, all the low type countries switch to a strategy of no
ratication. The agreement does not get legally binding and every country emits. This
cannot be optimal. Though, if the quota is higher, then all low type countries ratify.
The higher quota implies that more countries have to be of low type. Therefore, the risk
of breakdown of the agreement is increased as more low type countries are needed for
ratication. This cannot be optimal either.
Next, I discuss some comparative statics results. The impact of an increase in the
benet parameter of the low type is straightforward. The incentive expression (2) increases
with an increase in the low type parameter L, as the costs increase in case the country
is not pivotal and at the same time the gains decrease in case the country is pivotal. The
optimal quota must therefore be increased.
Proposition 3 With 1 < L  N < H and p 2 (0; 1), the optimal quota Q (L; p;N) is
increasing in L.
Proof. The incentive expression is increasing with L as
@D (L; p;N)
@L
=
N 1X
i=Q 1
b (ijN   1) > 0
Furthermore, we know that the incentive expression decreases with Q for all Q  Q0 =
p (N   L)+L and increases for all Q > Q0 = p (N   L)+L. As the incentive expression
starts from a positive and ends with a negative value, the cuto¤ level Q0 has to be larger
than the optimal quota, Q  Q0. The incentive expression is decreasing around the
optimal quota Q. This implies that the optimal quota Q (L; p;N) increases with the
benet parameter L.
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The impact of an increase in the probability of the low type is less straightforward.
On the one hand, as the probability of the low type increases, the probability that there
are su¢ cient ratications from low type countries increases. On the other hand, the e¤ect
on the probability of being pivotal is undetermined; the probability could be increasing or
decreasing. The following proposition shows that even if the probability of being pivotal
increases with an increase of p, the gain associated with this is o¤set by the costs of the
increased probability of su¢ cient ratications. The incentive expression increases and the
optimal quota increases with the probability of a low type.
Proposition 4 With 1 < L  N < H and p 2 (0; 1), the optimal quota Q (L; p;N) is
increasing in p 2 (0; 1).
The proof is delegated to Appendix 6.C. At rst, the impact of a variation of the
number of countries N seems ambiguous. On the one hand, as the number of countries
increases, the probability that there are su¢ cient ratications from low type countries
increases. This is due to the fact that the cumulative distribution function of the bi-
nomial distribution with parameter N rst order stochastically dominates the binomial
distribution with parameter N   1. On the other hand, the e¤ect on the probability of
being pivotal is undetermined; the probability could be increasing or decreasing with an
increase in N . Intuitively, the optimal quota should be increasing in the number of coun-
tries N . A constant or even decreasing quota with increasing N does not seem plausible
as the probability that su¢ cient countries out of the N  1 other countries are of low typePN 1
P=Q b (P jN   1; p) is converging to one when N becomes large while the probability of
being pivotal b (Q  1jN   1; p) goes to zero. Hence, low type countries have an incentive
to abstain from ratication. Therefore, we should observe an increase in the quota with
N . Proposition 5 conrms this intuition.
Proposition 5 With 1 < L  N < H and p 2 (0; 1), the optimal quota Q (L; p;N) is
increasing in N .
The proof is delegated to Appendix 6.C. One might also be interested in how the
relative optimal quota q (L; p;N) =
Q(L;p;N)
N evolves with an increasing number of
countries N . To see this, I run simulations of the relative optimal quota over a parameter
range of N 2 f3; 4; :::; 150g, p 2 f0:05; 0:1; :::; 0:95g and L 2 f2; 4; :::; Ng. Figure 2 shows
the simulated evolution of the relative optimal quota q with the number of countries N
and the probability p for a given L = 50. The value of L is picked arbitrarily and is in no
way particular. The x-axis depicts the number of countries N , while the y-axis shows the
values of the probability of a low type p. The graph shows that the relative optimal quota
starts with a value close to or equal to one at N = L, regardless of the probability. With
an increasing number of countries N the relative optimal quota decreases. This implies
that the (absolute) optimal quota Q increases underproportionately to the increase in N .
Furthermore, the smaller the probability of the low type, the steeper is the decrease in
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Figure 2: Relative Optimal Quota Q=N for L = 50
the relative optimal quota. The graph also illustrates the result that the optimal quota is
increasing in the probability of the low type p.
So far, we answered the question what can be optimally achieved when countries either
ratify or not. Unlike case 1, the restriction to pure strategies might be binding. If low type
countries chose to ratify with probability q < 1, it might be possible to increase aggregate
expected utility by lowering the quota. Suppose all low types follow the symmetric mixed
strategy to ratify with probability q. Given all other countries employ the mixed strategy,
country i has no incentive to deviate if the expected utility from ratication equals the
expected utility from no ratication. The incentive expression (2), where the probability
p is substituted by the probability ep = pq, has to hold with equality,
(L   1)
N 1X
P=Q
b (P jN   1; ep)  (Q  L) b (Q  1jN   1; ep) = 0. (2)
Whether there exists a q 6= 0 that solves this equation, depends on the parameter con-
stellations.9 In the following example, we nd that the modied incentive expression has
got an inner solution with q 2 (0; 1) and that the aggregate expected utility increases in
comparison to the pure strategy equilibrium. Suppose the number of countries is N = 7,
the low benet parameter is L = 4 and the probability of a low type is p = 12 . With pure
strategies, the incentive expression (2) is positive for a quota of Q = 5 at D (4; 5) = 664
and becomes negative for Q = 6 with D (4; 6) =   9128 . Thus, the optimal quota is Q = 6
resulting in an expected aggregate utility of  2:8359 + 12H . Contrary, when we allow
9As shown in Appendix 6.C, the incentive expression is increasing in ep for all ep  Q L
N L . Thus, it starts
in the origin, decreases with q until q = Q L
(N L)p and increases thereafter. If the reversal point
Q L
(N L)p is
large, it is likely that there exists no solution q 6= 0. The expression is thus negative for all q 6= 0, and we
are in a corner solution where each low type country choses to ratify with certainty, q = 1.
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Figure 3: Mixing Probability q (Q) given p = 0:5
for mixed strategies, the incentive expression (2) equals zero at the mixing probability
q = 8 
p
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5 for a quota of Q = 5. The attached aggregate expected utility amounts to
 2:7252 + 12H , which exceeds the expected utility with pure strategies.
Simulations can give an indication how results change when we allow for mixed strate-
gies. I simulate the scenario with mixed strategies for a parameter range ofN 2 f3; 4; :::; 150g,
L 2 f2; 4; :::; Ng and p 2 f0:05; 0:1; :::; 0:95g. First, I compute the probability of ratica-
tion q (Q) given a quota Q. Next, I calculate the quota Q that maximises the aggregate
expected utility given the probability q (Q). For a low type probability of p = 0:5, Figure
3 shows the simulated mixing probability q (Q) given the optimal quota Q. The x-axis
depicts the number of countries N , while the y-axis shows the benet parameter of the
low type L. I nd that the corner solution, where the probability is q (Q) = 1, is the
rule rather than the exception. There is only an inner solution when the benet para-
meter L is relatively small. Moreover, the smallest value for the mixing probability is
q (Q) = 0:83. It occurs when the number of countries is N = 7, the benet parameter
equals L = 2 and the optimal quota is Q = 3. The simulation results for p = 0:5 are in
no way di¤erent to those with other values for p. We include further simulation results in
Appendix 6.D. The simulation results illustrate that the limitation to pure strategies is
not very restrictive and that it loses importance with an increasing benet parameter L.
Summarising the case of simultaneous ratications, we have seen that, if the benet
of the high type is smaller than the social costs, the optimal quota is 100% and the rst
best can be achieved. Otherwise, if the benet of the high type exceeds the social costs,
the optimal quota is as low as possible, taking into account that low type countries must
still have an incentive to ratify. Thus, the results in theses two cases are diametrically
13
opposed.
4 Sequential Ratication
In this section, I investigate the implications of sequential rather than simultaneous play.
Instead of deciding all at once, countries ratify one after the other, observing the decisions
made by all previous countries. One crucial di¤erence between these two scenarios is
that with sequential ratication, the process of ratifying stops as soon as a su¢ cient
number of ratications occurred. No country has an incentive to keep on ratifying after
the su¢ cient number of ratications is reached as long as its benet type exceeds one,
i.e. i > 1. Therefore, with sequential ratication, the equilibrium outcome is either no
binding agreement or an agreement with exactly Q ratifying parties.
Sequential ratication is a game of incomplete information. The country only faces
uncertainty regarding the type of the countries moving after it. The solution concept is
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). In contrast to the case of simultaneous ratication,
the PBE is essentially unique.10 The history of the game can be summarised by the num-
ber of countries that have ratied so far. The restriction to pure strategies is innocuous
when countries ratify sequentially. There exists no mixed strategy equilibrium. Consider
the ratication decision of the last country when this country is pivotal. If the benet
parameter i is smaller than Q, the last countrys optimal strategy is to ratify with cer-
tainty. Further, if the second last country is pivotal, it is also going to ratify for sure.
However, if it is not pivotal and the quota is not yet satised, then the country compares
the expected utility from ratifying with the expected utility from not ratifying. Depending
on the model parameters, one of the two expected utilities exceeds the other. It is thus
optimal to play the pure strategy that leads to the higher expected utility. Only in the
case, where the model parameters are such that both expected utilities are identical, does
any mixed strategy belong to the set of optimal strategies. The same reasoning applies to
all previous countries.
In analysing sequential ratication, I distinguish again between the two previous cases;
the case where cooperation aims at the high types and where it aims at the low types. The
outcome of the rst case is largely the same as under simultaneous ratication, the optimal
quota is as high as possible. Although I cannot determine the optimal quota in the second
case, I nd that the expected aggregate surplus is always higher under simultaneous than
under sequential ratication.
10 It is unique up to a variation of the strategy after histories where it is not possible to achieve a su¢ cient
number of ratications. Suppose it is the turn of country (N   i), P countries have ratied before it and
Q have to ratify in total. A su¢ cient number of ratications cannot be achieved, if too few countries have
ratied so far, that is, if P < Q  i  1.
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Case 1: Participation of High Types This is the case where the benet of local
emission to both types of countries is smaller than the social damage of local emission,
H < N . Again the optimal quota is 100% and it achieves the rst best outcome, i.e. no
emission by any country. Under a 100% quota each country is pivotal regardless of the
order of play. The strategy to ratify regardless of the type and the history of the game
is implementable if either L > 1 or if L  1 and the condition of Proposition 1 that
H  1+(N   1) (1  p) is satised. In contrast to simultaneous ratications, where there
are multiple equilibria, this is the unique PBE. In case the low benet types emit whenever
the agreement fails, that is if L > 1, the intuition for an optimal quota of 100% is the
same as in the simultaneous case. Countries, when ratifying, chose between a situation of
no emission and a situation with full emission by all countries. Every country thus has
an incentive to ratify. Contrary, if the low benet types do not emit in any case, it has to
hold that the benets from emission do not outweigh the expected gains from ratication.
That is, the condition of Proposition 1 that H  1+ (N   1) (1  p) has to be met. This
condition does not depend on the position in the order of play as the decisions of the
previous countries do not reveal information. E¤ectively, the simultaneous and sequential
specications yield the same outcome.
Whenever the high type is large, i.e. H > 1 + (N   1) (1  p), then an agreement
cannot help ameliorate the free-rider problem, just as in the simultaneous case. A 100%
quota cannot induce cooperation among the high types. Lowering the quota reduces the
expected gain of an agreement as fewer countries participate. Thus a lower quota is even
less capable of inducing participation of the high types.
The result of the sequential game is therefore identical to the result in the simultaneous
case. We either achieve the rst best by implementing a 100% quota, or we cannot improve
upon the situation at all.11
Case 2: Participation of Low Types In this case, high types never participate
voluntarily in any agreement, as their individual benets outweigh the social damage,
H  N . The aggregate expected utility of the emission game is given by U (0) =PN
i=0
 
N
i
!
pi (1  p)N i  iL + (N   i) H  N2 if no contracting stage is preceding
it.
A 100% ratication quota is clearly better than no agreement at all as it can achieve
cooperation of all countries in the case where all countries are of low type. Each country is
pivotal and the optimal strategy of a low type country is to ratify regardless of the history.
The aggregate expected surplus is
11The analysis of sequential ratication is closely related to sequential voting mechanisms. In particular,
Dekel and Piccione (2000) show that in unanimity games, essentially the whole set of equilibria is the same
in all sequential structures. There, sequential structures range from the one-period voting game, which
would be the purely simultaneous case, over combined simultaneous and sequential structures to a purely
sequential structure where each voter decides in a distinct period.
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U (N) =
PN 1
i=0
 
N
i
!
pi (1  p)N i  iL + (N   i) H  N2. This is clearly better than
no agreement as U (N)  U (0) =  pNN (L  N)  0.
Reducing the quota to Q = N 1 implies that, on the one hand, one country free-rides
surely, but on the other hand, the risk of a breakdown of the agreement is reduced. The
optimal strategy for low types depends on the history of the game and on the position
in the order of play. Whenever a country is pivotal,12 the optimal strategy is to ratify.
If it is not pivotal and the quota is not yet fullled, the country trades-o¤ the gains
from free-riding with the probability that the agreement fails due to its decision, and the
associated loss. The probability that the agreement fails due to its decision depends on
how many previous countries have ratied and how many more countries are to follow.
If the benets from emission are su¢ ciently large, the country takes the risk and tries to
free-ride. Finally, if the quota is already satised, the optimal strategy is to abstain from
ratication and free-ride. For a quota Q = N   1, the optimal strategy for the (N   i)th
country is given by
sN i (P jL; N   1) =
8><>: 1
if P  Q  i  1 and L  Q or
if P = Q  i, i 6= 0 and L  (1  p)Q
0 else
for all i 2 f0; :::; N   1g. P signies the number of countries that have already signed the
agreement.13 The proof of this strategy being the equilibrium strategy can be found in
Appendix 6.E.
Under the assumption that L  (1  p)Q, the expected aggregate surplus increases
with a smaller quota, if p  N(N 1)N(N 1)+1 . Otherwise, under the assumption that L >
(1  p)Q, the expected aggregate surplus increases with a smaller quota, if p  N 1N .14
Both conditions are relatively mild, in particular if the number of countries N is large.
Thus, it is protable to reduce the quota from Q = N to Q = N   1 in most cases. This
nding is intuitive as the gain from the reduction in the risk of breakdown of the agreement
is high if the quota is large. Yet, the loss remains small, as a quota of Q = N   1 allows
only one country to free-ride.
A further reduction in the quota complicates the equilibrium analysis. Yet, countries
still face the basic trade-o¤ between risk of failure and free-riding. A complete characteri-
sation of the PBE and therewith the optimal quota is cumbersome since it relies on many
case distinctions, as the simple example of a (N   1)-quota illustrates.15 In what follows,
12Suppose P countries have already ratied. Then, there need to be Q P more ratications. A country
(N   i) is pivotal if the number of countries i following that country equals the number of countries still
needed to satisfy the ratication quota minus 1, i.e. i = Q  P   1.
13The number of countries P that have ratied before the (N   i)th country equals at most the number
of countries preceding it, i.e. P  N   i  1 = Q  i.
14For the derivation, see Appendix 6.E.
15 It would be interesting to simulate the sequential equilibrium depending on the model parameters L,
p, and N , and compare the resulting optimal quota with the simultaneous case.
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I characterise two special cases. In the rst case, benets from emission for low types are
very high such that every countrys incentive to free-ride is large. Countries therefore only
ratify if they are pivotal. In the other extreme, benets from emission for low types are
small and each country rather prefers to ratify than to risk the failure of the agreement.
Proposition 6 characterises these two cases.
Proposition 6 Given a quota Q, the optimal strategy for a low type country at position
(N   i) in the order of ratication
Case 1) if Q  L   (p;Q) = (1  p)Q, is
sN i (P jL; Q) =
(
1 if P  Q  i  1
0 else
,
Case 2) if L   (p;Q) = (1  p)N QQ, is
sN i (P jL; Q) =
(
1 if P  Q  1
0 else.
Proof. ad 1) Suppose Q  L  (1  p)Q and suppose every country follows
the proposed strategy, a country (N   i) has no incentive to deviate: After histories
where so few countries have ratied, that it is not possible to fulll the quota with
the remaining countries anyway, i.e.P < Q   i   1, to ratify is among the optimal ac-
tions. Whenever the number of participating countries is such that exactly i + 1 rati-
cations are still needed, P = Q   i   1, the country is pivotal and it prefers to rat-
ify, as long as L  Q. Suppose the country is not pivotal and P = Q   i + k with
k 2 f0; :::; ig, that is, i   k ratications are needed for satisfying the quota. If coun-
try (N   i) raties, the following k + 1 countries do not ratify, regardless of their type.
The countries thereafter are pivotal and ratify if of low type. The expected utility is
E (u (1)) = pi k 1Q +
 
1  pi k 1 L   N . If, however, the country (N   i) does not
ratify, then only the k following countries do not ratify, regardless of their type. The
expected utility of no ratication is E (u (0)) = L   N + pi kQ. The (N   i)th country
has an incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy if E (u (1))   E (u (0)) > 0. That
is equivalent to (1  p)Q > L. As by assumption L  (1  p)Q, no country has an
incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy. Finally, if the quota is already satised,
P  Q, the country has no incentive to ratify.
ad 2) Suppose L  (1  p)N QQ and suppose every country follows the proposed strat-
egy to ratify as long as the quota is not satised. A country (N   i) has no incentive to
deviate: Suppose P = Q  1  k with k 2
(
f0; 1; :::; Q  1g if i  N  Q
fQ N + i; :::; Q  1g if i > N  Q , that
is k + 1 ratications are needed for satisfying the quota. If k > i, then it is not possible
to fulll the quota with the remaining countries, i.e. P < Q   i   1, one optimal action
is to ratify. If instead k  i, the agreement is feasible. Regardless of country (N   i),
all following low type countries ratify until the ratication quota is met. The utility of
ratication is thus E (u (1)) =
Pi
j=k b (jji; p)Q +

1 Pij=k b (jji; p) L   N , whereas
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the expected utility of no ratication is E (u (0)) =
Pi
j=k+1 b (jji; p)Q+ L N . There is
a positive incentive to deviate if E (u (0))  E (u (1)) > 0, which is equivalent to
L >
b (kji; p)Pi
j=k b (jji; p)
Q = e (k; i) . (5)
In Appendix 6.F, we show that the following ordering holds
e (k   1; i  1)  e (k; i)  e (k; i  1) .
 The incentive to deviate for countries following the Qth country, that is, for coun-
tries with i  N   Q, is never positive. Equation (5) can never be satised as by
assumption L  b (0jN  Q)Q = e (0; N  Q) and e (0; N  Q)  e (k; i) for all
i  N  Q and k  0.
 The incentive to deviate for countries before the Qth country, that is for countries
with i > N   Q, is also never positive as L  e (0; N  Q)  e (1; N  Q+ 1) e (2; N  Q+ 2)  :::  e (Q  1; N   1).
If P  Q, the contract comes into force for sure and each country prefers to free-ride.
Clearly, the threshold levels  (p;Q) and  (p;Q) for the benet parameter depend both
on the probability of the low type as well as on the quota. The higher the quota, the less
likely is case 1 and the more likely is case 2. The reverse holds for the probability of the
low type. The higher p, the more likely we are in case 1 and the less likely we are in case
2.
In particular, the second case is interesting where, regardless of the history, each low
type country raties as long as the quota is not yet satised. In this case, the simultaneous
as well as sequential representation lead to exactly the same probability of success of the
agreement with a given quota Q  Q larger than the optimal quota of the simultaneous
case. However, under the sequential representation, exactly Q countries ratify, whereas
with simultaneous ratication, most probably more than Q countries ratify. Thus, the
expected aggregate surplus is larger under simultaneous than under sequential ratica-
tion for any quota. Furthermore, for any given quota, the probability of success of the
agreement is largest whenever we are in the equilibrium of case 2. Therefore, the ex-
pected aggregate surplus is larger with simultaneous rather than sequential ratication.
The following proposition summarises this result.
Proposition 7 For a given quota Q  Q, the expected aggregate surplus is higher under
simultaneous than under sequential ratication.
The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted. In the simultaneous ratication
game, every low type country raties, given the quota is larger than the optimal quota
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Q  Q. Turning from simultaneous to sequential play, some low type countries might
abstain from ratication with the same quota. That lowers, on the one hand, the number
of participating countries and, on the other, the probability of a success of the agreement.
It remains to be noted that ex post some countries are better o¤ in the sequential rather
than the simultaneous game.16
5 Concluding remarks
The present model, proposes a three stage international bargaining game where countries
rst determine a ratication quota. Then, they decide whether to ratify and nally they
decide over emission of a global pollutant. In a setting with incomplete information,
two country types and a binary contribution to the provision, I examine the di¤erences
between simultaneous and sequential ratication. When the benets from emission of both
types are smaller than the social costs, the outcome in the simultaneous case is essentially
identical to the sequential case. The optimal quota is 100% and achieves the rst best.
With the high types benets exceeding the social costs, I nd that the optimal quota is
as small as possible, if ratication is simultaneous. In the sequential ratication case, I
cannot determine the optimal quota. However, I nd that the aggregate expected surplus
decreases with respect to the simultaneous case.
The crucial assumption driving the results of the model is the informational structure.
The risk of failure of the agreement is introduced through the (costless) acquisition of new
information concerning the benets of a country. In reality, ratication processes di¤er
from country to country.17 They often involve the legislative body of a country to decide
on the acceptance of the agreement. These processes take a substantial amount of time.
The outcrop of new information can realistically occur during that period of time. In the
case of the Kyoto Protocol, the research group of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change has published several special reports as well as a new Assessment Report since the
Kyoto Conference in 1997, which constituted the start of the ratication period. Moreover,
in the time period between the signature and the ratication of an agreement, the internal
political situation of a country as well as the political and economic relationships to other
countries can change. All this can inuence the benets accruing from emission. I do not
model the national political processes leading to the ratication decision explicitly. These
are denitely very important, but beyond the scope of the present paper.
A major restriction of the model is the abstraction from compliance problems, in
particular, as compliance could depend on the number of countries that have ratied the
16This is related to a result in an early version of the paper by Börgers (2004) that explores the e¤ect
of sequential voting. Under certain circumstances, Börgers shows that sequential voting weakly Pareto-
dominates simultaneous voting. With sequential voting fewer agents incur the costs of voting. Hence, the
public good is provided at lower total costs. The crucial di¤erence to the ratication game is that in the
voting setting, the amountof the public good does not change with the number of voters.
17For an overview of the di¤erent processes within Europe, see Stoiber and Thurner (2000).
19
agreement. The more countries join the agreement, the larger is potentially the pressure
from these countries on non-complying members. Furthermore, I do not allow for transfer
payments. Transfer payments from the low benet to the high benet countries could
potentially induce all countries to participate in an agreement. However, low benet
countries can have an incentive to pretend to be of high type.18 The assumption of no
side-payments allows me to concentrate on the participation decision of each country.19
When introducing sequential ratication, further issues arise such as renegotiation and
the order of ratication. The exogenously given order of ratication allocates bargaining
power in favour of countries that are positioned later in the order. These countries might
be able to exploit the ratication of previous countries. During the ratication process of
the Kyoto Protocol, the case of Denmark suggests that countries do renegotiate with others
that have already committed to ratication. The European Unions target was that all
member states ratify until the World Summit of Sustainable Development in Johannesburg
2002. Denmark threatened not to do so, if its share of the entire unions reduction burden
would not be lowered. An extension of the model would therefore consider renegotiation.
Endogenising the order of ratications, by allowing each country to chose its ratication
time, represents another interesting possibility to extend the model.20
6 Appendix
6.A Simultaneous ratication, case 1: mixed strategies
In case 1 where L < 1 and H > 1 + (N   1) (1  p) = H (N; p) and countries ratify
simultaneously, the restriction to pure strategies is innocuous. To see this, suppose the
quota is Q = N   s for s 2 f0; 1; :::; N   1g and all high type countries ratify with a
probability q 2 (0; 1). For this to be an equilibrium, the expected utility of no ratication
has to equal the expected utility of ratication. However, in the following, I illustrate
that the expected utility of no ratication exceeds the expected utility of ratication for
all q 2 (0; 1). The expected utility of no ratication consists of a) the probability that
the agreement succeeds times the benet H minus the sum of all emissions and b) the
probability of a failure times the benet H minus the associated aggregate emissions, i.e.
E (u (0jH ; N   s)) =
Ps
h=1
PN h
P=0 b (P jN   1; p) b (N   P   hjN   1  P; q) (H   h)

18Generally, incentive problems are tackled by the mechanism design literature. For a good survey article,
see Moore (1992). Mechanism design focuses on whether there exists a mechanism that implements the
e¢ cient level of a public good. In contrast to this, I postulate a given institution and analyse the provision
of the public good within that institution.
19For a recent paper that analyses the role of transfer schemes in international environmental agreements
within the framework of coalition theory, see Carraro, Eyckmans, and Finus (2005).
20There is some literature on dynamic games of voluntary contributions to a public project, for example
Marx and Matthews (2000) and the literature cited there. In their paper, Marx and Matthews assume
that players have perfect information concerning the utility functions of every player. Furthermore, they
neglect the impact of the minimum participation rule.
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+
PN s
P=0 b (P jN   1; p)
PN s P 1
j=0 b (jjN   1  P; q) (H + P  N). The expected utility
of ratication is dened analogously and equals
E (u (1jH ; N   s)) =  
Ps+1
h=1
PN h
P=0 b (P jN   1; p) b (N   1  h  P jN   1  P; q) (h  1)
+
PN s 1
P=0 b (P jN   1; p)
PN s P 2
j=0 b (jjN   1  P; q) (H + P  N). The di¤erence in
expected utilities is given by
D (s) = E (u (0jH ; N   s))  E (u (1jH ; N   s))
=
sX
h=1
 
N hX
P=0
b (P jN   1; p) b (N   P   hjN   1  P; q) (H   1)
!
+
N s 1X
P=0
b (P jN   1; p) b (N   s  P   1jN   1  P; q) (H + P   (N   s)) .
From the initial condition that
H > H (N; p)
$
N 1X
P=0
b (P jN   1; p) (H + P  N) > 0,
we know that the di¤erence is positive for the starting value s = 0,
D (0) =
PN 1
P=0 b (P jN   1; p) b (N   P   1jN   1  P; q) (H + P  N) > 0. Further-
more, I checked numerically that the rst di¤erences D (s) D (s  1) are positive. To do
this, I simulated
D (s) D (s  1)
=
N s 1X
P=0
b (P jN   1; p) b (N   s  P   1jN   1  P; q)

H + P  N + s
1  q

over a parameter range of N 2 f3; 4; :::; 50g, p; q 2 f0:05; 0:1; :::; 0:95g and
H 2 fH (N; p) ; :::; Ng. The simulations show that the di¤erence D (s)   D (s  1) is
positive, implying that D () increases in s. As D () starts with a positive value at s = 0,
it is positive for all s. There is thus no probability q 2 (0; 1) that equates the expected
utility of no ratication and the expected utility of ratication.
6.B Derivation of the incentive function
In section 3, case 2, the proposed symmetric pure strategy is to ratify if of low type and to
abstain from ratication otherwise. The incentive function (2) gives the incentive to devi-
ate from this strategy for a low type country given all other countries follow it. On the one
hand, the expected utility of no ratication is given by a) the benet of emission L, plus
b) the damage of global emission if the agreement gets binding, that is P  Q, times the
probability that this happens, plus c) the damage if the agreement fails times the probabil-
ity, i.e. E (u (0jL; Q)) = L  
PN 1
P=Q prob (P jN   1) (N   P ) 
PQ 1
P=0 prob (P jN   1)N .
On the other hand, the expected utility of ratication is given by a) the damage of
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global emission if the agreement gets binding, that is P  Q   1, times the attached
probability, plus b) the damage if the agreement fails minus the benet of local emis-
sion times the probability, i.e. E (u (1jL; Q)) =  
PN 1
P=Q 1 prob (P jN   1) (N   1  P ) PQ 2
P=0 prob (P jN   1) (N   L). The probability that P countries ratify out of the N   1
remaining countries is given by the binomial distribution
b (P jN   1; p) =
 
N   1
P
!
pP (1  p)N 1 P :
The incentive function is thus
D (L; Q) = E (u (0jL; Q))  E (u (1jL; Q))
= (L   1)
N 1X
P=Q
b (P jN   1; p)  (Q  L) b (Q  1jN   1; p) .
6.C Proofs
Details to the proof of Proposition 2 Proposition 2 establishes that the optimal
quota is the smallest integer that renders the incentive expression equal to naught. To
proof this, we rst show that, given the proposed strategy s (i) =
(
1 if i = L
0 else
, the
individual expected utility is decreasing in the quota Q. The inidividual expected utility
is
U (Q) = pE (u (LjQ)) + (1  p)E (u (H jQ))
= p
0@  N 1X
P=Q 1
b (P jN   1; p) (N   1  P ) + (L  N)
Q 2X
P=0
b (P jN   1; p)
1A
+(1  p)
0@H   N 1X
P=Q
b (P jN   1; p) (N   P ) N
Q 1X
P=0
b (P jN   1; p)
1A .
Taking rst di¤erences yields
U (Q)  U (Q  1)
= p (b (Q  1jN   1; p) (N  Q) + (L  N) b (Q  1jN   1; p))
+ (1  p) (b (QjN   1; p) (N  Q) Nb (QjN   1; p))
= b (Q  1jN   1; p)

p ( Q+ L)  (1  p) p
1  p
N  Q
Q
Q

with the use of (4)
= b (Q  1jN   1; p) p (L  N) < 0.
This shows that the individual expected utility is decreasing in the quota Q.
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Proof of Proposition 4 Proposition 4 states that the optimal quota is increasing the
the probability of a low type p. To proof this, I rst show that the probability of suf-
cient ratications is increasing in the probability of the low tpye in the following way
@
PN 1
P=Q b(P jN 1;p)
@p =
 
N   1
Q
!
QpQ 1 (1  p)N 1 Q > 0. This is shown by induction.
1. Suppose the above holds for Q, than for Q  1:
@
PN 1
P=Q 1 b(P jN 1;p)
@p =
@
PN 1
P=Q b(P jN 1;p)
@p +
@b(Q 1jN 1;p)
@p
=
 
N   1
Q
!
QpQ 1 (1  p)N 1 Q+ 
N   1
Q  1
!
(Q  1) pQ 2 (1  p)N Q   (N  Q) pQ 1 (1  p)N Q 1

. After a cou-
ple of transformations and using (4) this yields the required result
@
PN 1
P=Q 1 b(P jN 1;p)
@p =
 
N   1
Q  1
!
(Q  1) pQ 2 (1  p)N Q.
2. The statement holds for the starting value of Q = N   1,
@
PN 1
P=N 1 b(P jN 1;p)
@p =
@pN 1
@p = (N   1) pN 2.
Next, I determine the sign of the derivative of the incentive expression with respect to p:
@D(L;p;Q)
@p = (L   1)
@
PN 1
P=Q b(P jN 1;p)
@p   (Q  L) @b(Q 1jN 1;p)@p
= (L   1)
 
N   1
Q
!
QpQ 1 (1  p)N 1 Q
  (Q  L)
 
N   1
Q  1
!
pQ 2 (1  p)N Q 1

((Q  1) (1  p)  (N  Q) p)
After a couple of transformations and the use of
 
N   1
Q
!
Q =
 
N   1
Q  1
!
(N  Q),
this is equivalent to
@D (L; p;N)
@p
=
b (Q  1jN   1; p)
(1  p) p (Q  1) ((N   L) p  (Q  L))
(
 0 8p  Q LN L
< 0 8p < Q LN L
,
for all Q  L.
Furthermore, we know from the proof of Proposition 3 that Q  p (N   L) + L = Q0.
This implies that Q
 L
N L 
p(N L)+L L
N L = p. Hence, around the optimal quota the
incentive expression is increasing with p which translates into the optimal quota itself
being weakly increasing with p. 
Proof of Proposition 5 Proposition 5 says that the optimal quota is increasing in the
number of countries N . To see this, I rst show that the binomial distribution function
with parameter N +1 rst oder stochastically dominates the distribution with parameter
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N in the following way
Px
P=0 (b (P jN; p)  b (P jN + 1; p)) = b (xjN; p) p > 0 for all x 2
f0; 1; :::; Ng. This is shown by induction.
1. Suppose the above holds for x, then for x+ 1,
Px+1
P=0 (b (P jN; p)  b (P jN + 1; p))
= b (xjN; p) p+ b (x+ 1jN; p)  b (x+ 1jN + 1; p)
=
 
N
x
!
px+1 (1  p)N x+
 
N
x+ 1
!
px+1 (1  p)N x 1 
 
N + 1
x+ 1
!
px+1 (1  p)N x
= px+1 (1  p)N x 1
   
N
x
!
 
 
N + 1
x+ 1
!!
(1  p) +
 
N
x+ 1
!!
=
 
N
x+ 1
!
px+2 (1  p)N x 1 = b (x+ 1jN; p) p where we use (6).
The two binomial coe¢ cients
 
N
x
!
,
 
N + 1
x+ 1
!
can be combined such that
 
N
x
!
 
 
N + 1
x+ 1
!
=  
 
N
x+ 1
!
(6)
2. For the starting value x = 0, we know that
P0
P=0 (b (P jN; p)  b (P jN + 1; p)) =
(1  p)N p = b (0jN; p) p.
Next, I establish that the incentive function increases with N around the optimal quota,
D (N + 1) D (N) = (L   1)
0@ NX
P=Q
b (P jN; p) 
N 1X
P=Q
b (P jN   1; p)
1A
  (Q  L) (b (Q  1jN; p)  b (Q  1jN   1; p)) . (7)
Using the fact that the binomial distribution with N rst order stochastically dominates
the binomial with N   1, we get that
NX
P=Q
b (P jN; p) 
N 1X
P=Q
b (P jN   1; p)
=
Q 1X
P=0
b (P jN   1; p) 
Q 1X
P=0
b (P jN; p) = b (Q  1jN   1; p) p.
Substituting this into equation (7), we get
D (N + 1) D (N) = (L   1) b (Q  1jN   1; p) p
  (Q  L) (b (Q  1jN; p)  b (Q  1jN   1; p))
=  b (Q  1jN   1; p) p Q (b (Q  1jN; p)  b (Q  1jN   1; p))
+L (b (Q  1jN; p)  (1  p) b (Q  1jN   1; p))
=
b (Q  1jN; p)
N (1  p) (Q  1) (p (N + 1  L) + L  Q) .
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We therefore know that the incentive function increases for all small Q and decreases
thereafter, i.e.
D (N + 1) D (N)
(
> 0 p (N + 1  L) + L > Q
 0 else .
As we know, the optimal quota Q is smaller than Q0 = p (N   L) + L. Therefore, the
incentive expression increases around the optimal quota and the optimal quota increases
in the number of countries N . 
6.D Simulation results for mixed strategies
The following two gures report simultation results on the optimal mixing strategy q (Q)
for di¤erent values of the low type probability p. The x-axis depicts the number of countries
N , while the y-axis shows the benet parameter of the low type L. Panels 1-4 of Figure 4
show the results for small probabilities p and panels 1-4 of Figure 5 for large probabilities
p. Furthermore, low type countries optimally ratify with a relatively large probability
q (Q). The smallest probability over the entire parameter range is q (Q) = 0:76 with
Q = 5. It occurs at N = 21, p = 0:1 and L = 4. Again, I nd that the corner solution
is the rule rather than the exception. There is only an inner solution when the benet
parameter L is relatively small.
Figure 4: Mixing probability, p 2 f0:1; :::; 0:4g
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Figure 5: Mixing probability, p 2 f0:6; :::; 0:9g
6.E Equilibrium under sequential ratication and Q = N   1
For a quota Q = N   1, the proposed equilibrium strategy for the (N   i)th country is
sN i (P jL; N   1) =
8><>: 1
if P  Q  i  1 and L  Q or
if P = Q  i, i 6= 0 and L  (1  p)Q
0 else
for all i 2 f0; :::; N   1g. To see that this is indeed the optimal strategy, we distinguish
between histories after which the country is pivotal, not pivotal or the quota is satised.
1) Suppose P < Q  i  1. There are only i countries to follow the (N   i)th country.
Even if all i+ 1 countries ratify, the agreement does not get binding. It lacks at least one
ratication. Therefore the strategy after this history is irrelevant. The proposed strategy
belongs therefore to the optimal ones.
2) Suppose P = Q   i   1. Then the (N   i)th countrys decision is pivotal. As long
as L  N   1 = Q, it raties.
3) Suppose P = Q   i. For the last country i = 0, this implies that the quota is
satised. The last country will therefore not ratify. For all other countries, the trade-o¤
between free-riding and the increase in risk of contractual breakdown becomes relevant.
Suppose all countries follow the above strategy. If the (N   i)th country does not ratify,
another i ratications are needed. All remaining i countries ratify if they are of low type,
as they are pivotal. The agreement gets binding with probability pi. The expected utility
of no ratication for the (N   i)th country is given by
E (u) = L  N + piQ. (8)
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If instead the (N   i)th country does ratify and only i  1 further ratications are needed,
then the optimal strategy of the remaining i countries depends on the benet parameter.
3.1) If L  (1  p)Q, then all countries, except the last, ratify whenever they are
of low type. The probability of su¢ cient ratications is pi + ipi 1 (1  p). The expected
utility of ratication is given by
E (u) = L  N +
 
pi + ipi 1 (1  p) (Q  L) . (9)
The incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy for the (N   i)th country is given by
the di¤erence in expected utility (8)>(9)
$ L > i (1  p)
(i  (i  1) p)Q.
This condition contradicts the assumption that L  (1  p)Q. For all i  1, it holds that
i(1 p)
i (i 1)p  (1  p). Therefore, the (N   i)th country has no incentive to deviate from the
proposed strategy to ratify.
3.2) If L > (1  p)Q, then the rst country following the (N   i)th country does not
ratify. All the remaining i 1 countries ratify, if they are of low type. As i 1 ratications
are still needed, the probability of su¢ cient ratications is given by pi 1. The expected
utility of ratication is given by
E (u) =
 
1  pi 1 L + pi 1Q N . (10)
The incentive to deviate for the (N   i)th country is given by the di¤erence in expected
utility (10)>(8)
(1  p)Q > L.
This condition contradicts the assumption that L > (1  p)Q. Therefore the (N   i)th
country has no incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy which is not to ratify.
The aggreate expected surplus under the assumption that L  (1  p)Q is given by
U (N   1) = pN (L  N) +NpN 1 (1  p) (H  N)
+
N 2X
P=0
 
N
P
!
pP (1  p)N P  PL + (N   P ) H  N2 .
It increases with a smaller quota if
U (N   1)  U (N)
= pN (L  N) +NpN 1 (1  p) (H  N)
+
N 2X
P=0
 
N
P
!
pP (1  p)N P  PL + (N   P ) H  N2
 
 
N 1X
P=0
 
N
P
!
pP (1  p)N P  PL + (N   P ) H  N2!
= (N   L) pN 1 (N (N   1) (1  p)  p)  0,
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which is equivalent to p  N(N 1)N(N 1)+1 . For a large number of countries N , this is a relatively
mild condition. The aggregate expected surplus under the assumption that L > (1  p)Q
is given by
U (N   1) = pN (L  N) + pN 1 (1  p) (H  N)
+ (N   1) pN 1 (1  p)  (N   1) L + H  N2
+
N 2X
P=0
 
N
P
!
pP (1  p)N P  PL + (N   P ) H  N2 .
Thus the expected aggregate surplus increases with a smaller quota, if
U (N   1)  U (N)
= pN (L  N) + pN 1 (1  p) (H  N)
+ (N   1) pN 1 (1  p)  (N   1) L + H  N2
 
 
N
N   1
!
pN 1 (1  p)  (N   1) L + H  N2
= pN 1 (N   L) ((1  p) (N   1)  p)  0,
which is equivalent to p  N 1N . Again, for a large number of countries N , this is a mild
condition.
6.F Comparative statics on e (k; i)
In the proof to Proposition 6, I derive a threshold level on the benet parameter e (k; i) =
b(kji;p)Pi
j=k b(jji;p)
. Here, I show the ordering of the threshold levels to be
e (k   1; i  1)  e (k; i)  e (k; i  1) .
1. Show that e (k; i)  e (k   1; i  1): 
i
k
!
pk (1  p)i k
Pi
j=k
 
i
j
!
pj (1  p)i j
Q 
 
i  1
k   1
!
pk 1 (1  p)i k
Pi 1
j=k 1
 
i  1
j
!
pj (1  p)i 1 j
Q
$ i
k
iX
j=k
 
i  1
j   1
!
pj (1  p)i j 
iX
j=k
 
i
j
!
pj (1  p)i j
$
iX
j=k
pj (1  p)i j
 
i  1
j   1
!
i (j   k)
kj
 0
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2. Show that e (k; i)  e (k; i  1): 
i
k
!
pk (1  p)i k
Pi
j=k
 
i
j
!
pj (1  p)i j
Q 
 
i  1
k
!
pk (1  p)i 1 k
Pi 1
j=k
 
i  1
j
!
pj (1  p)i 1 j
Q
$ pi 
i 1X
j=k
pj (1  p)i j
 
i
i  k
 
i  1
j
!
 
 
i
j
!!
$ pi 
i 1X
j=k
 
i  1
j
!
pj (1  p)i j

i (k   j)
(i  k) (i  j)

3. Show that eL (k; i)  eL (k   1; i): Follows from 1 and 2.
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